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IN THE, SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
PEARL GREGORY, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
DENYER & RIO GRANDE WESTERN 
RAILROAD COMPANY, a corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
8695 
The parties will be referred to .as in the court below. 
The plaintiff in her complaint claimed damages 
against the defendant on account of serious injuries she 
suffered in a crossing accident which occurred on the 
26th day of December, 1955, when she was a passenger 
in the front seat of an automobile driven by her husband. 
She claimed the automobile came to a stop on the east 
side of the crossing at Fourth North Street and about 
Pourth West Street in Salt Lake City, Utah, and after 
having made such stop, proceeded west across the inter-
section and the railroad tracks at a slow rate of speed. 
She claimed the defendant negligently drove the 
railroad train against the automobile in which she was 
Tiding, and the negligence complained of was: 
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2 
a. It had been the custom for flagmen to be sta-
tioned at the crossing, and that on this day, at the time 
of the accident, there was no flagman on duty. 
b. The defendant failed to give a signal by bell or 
whistle or otherwise. 
c. The defendant violated Section 5005 of the Re-
vised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, L tah, 1944, by oper-
ating its locomotive at a greater speed than 12 miles per 
hour. 
d. The crew of the train failed to keep a proper 
lookout and failed to use reasonable care in the operation 
of the train. 
The plaintiff then set out serious IDJUries she suf-
fered by reason of the accident (R. 1). 
The defendant's pleading admitted the operation of 
the train and that it had tracks which it used at the cross-
ing wherein the plaintiff was injured. Defendant denied 
all the other allegations of the complaint, and affinua-
tively claimed plaintiff's injuries were sustained solely 
through her mn1 negligence or the negligence of her hus-
band (R. 2). 
There had been no pre-trials in tllis ea~e, and the 
case caine on for jury trial before the Honorable Ray Van 
Cott, Jr. The plaintiff introduced all her evidence and 
rested. rrhe defendant put On llO testinwny~ .and Inade it~ 
two nwtions for a directed YPrdiet (R. 3 and 4). The 
court granted the n1otions and entered its order that the 
case be disn1issed with prejudice (R. 5 ). 
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Thereafter, within the time provided by law, the 
plaintiff filed her notice of appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
William Y. Tipton, a licensed land engineering sur-
veyor, identified the map, Exhibit P-1. This map was 
drawn to scale, and depicts the railroad tracks crossing 
Fourth North, and also the buildings in the vicinity, a 
gravelled road, line of telephone poles, curbs and side-
walks, stop signs, etc. (R. 13-17). Mr. Tipton also testi-
fied he took two pictures, Exhibits P-2 and P-3. Exhibit 
P-2 was taken from a point on the map, Exhibit P-1, 
designated as No. 1 picture, and it is about half way 
across the crossing and looking in a northwesterly direc-
tion. Exhibit P-3 was a picture taken by 1\:fr. Tipton 
east of the crossing ,and looking west. The point where 
the picture was taken was designated on the map, Exhibit 
P-1, as No.2 picture (R.17-22) . 
. Mr. Tipton said he could observe the track for ap-
proximately a quarter of a mile or a half mile, depending 
on what the obstruction would be from point No.1, which 
is illustrated by the picture, Exhibit P -2. Picture No. 1 
was taken about in line with the watchman's house. If the 
watchman were looking to the northwest he could see 
about what would be shown in picture No.1, Exhibit P-2. 
~Ir. Tjpton stated that at a point about 20 feet to the 
west, where picture No. ~' Exhibit P-3, was taken, there 
·would be no impairment of vision from any permanent, 
fjxed object, and that point would be 190 feet east of the 
east rail of the track where the accident occurred. 
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Glen S. Cahoon and Curtis Coombs, police officers, 
investigated the accident involved in this case. They 
arrived there about 11 :54 a.m. There was a train on the 
west track at the intersection with a diesel and 27 cars. 
There w.as a damaged automobile south of the intersection 
97 feet 7 inches from what the officers determined to be 
the point of impact of the engine and the automobile (R. 
32-33-50-52). Witness Cahoon marked Exhibit P-1 with 
an "X" where they determined the point of impact. He 
also marked on the map a point which he figured was 
97 feet 7 inches south of point of impact. This mark rep-
resented where the Gregory automobile came to rest 
after the accident. Exhibit P-8, a picture, is a view of the 
right side of the Gregory car. P-9 is a front view of the 
Gregory car. P-10 is another view of the right side of the 
Gregory car. P-11 is another vie"w of the right side of the 
Gregory car. P-12 (R. 35-36) is a view to the north of the 
track on which the accident occurred. Officers Curtis and 
Cahoon both testified there were box cars to the north 
of the intersection (R. 44 and R. 65). 
The plaintiff, Pearl Gregory, could not offer much 
information as to the accident. She was 61 years of age 
at that time and the wife of Marion Gregory·, the driver 
of the automobile. On account of the grievous injuries 
she sustained, she remembers nothing i1nmediately before 
or after the accident, except she stated she did ren1ember 
some box cars. Her hospital bills, not including the doctor 
bills, amounted to $686.70. ~Irs. Gregory was uncon-
scious for several days after the accident ( R. 73). 
The plaintiff's only eye witness to the accident was 
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her husband, :Marion vVilson Gregory, who died prior to 
the trial. The first 27 pages of his deposition were read 
into the record at the trial. On appeal, to save costs of 
transcribing the deposition, it was included in the record. 
Reference to pages will be referred to by "D-..... " 
At the deposition, :Mr. Gregory was questioned by 
the same attorney who handled the case at the trial court. 
Marion W. Gregory w.as 71 years of age at the time 
of the accident (R. 51). His eyesight and hearing were 
good. He was a laborer. He came from Oklahoma and 
Texas to Salt Lake City in 1944. He had seven living 
children. The car involved in the accident belonged to 
him .and was a 1940 Dodge 4-door sedan, properly in-
spected. 
On December 26, 1955, at about 11 :20 a.m., he drove 
to a filling station. The plaintiff was in the car on his 
right side, and they intended visiting a son at Garfield. 
It was a nice, clear, dry day- no snow (D-17). He drove 
south to 4th North and turned right to the railroad cross-
ing (D-8). l-Ie was acquainted with the crossing, had been 
over it lots and lots of times, and had seen a watchman 
there lots and lots of times (D-8 and 12). He knew where 
the watchman's shanty was (D-11). 
He .approached the crossing and stopped. He heard 
noises, a motor running, no bells. There was no watchman 
there to stop him (D-10, 11, 12 and 13). After Mr. 
Gregory stopped and saw the road was clear, and assumed 
he had the right of way on account of no watchman, he 
started with the car in low gear (D-10). He figured be-
cause there was no flagman there to stop him, he had the 
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right of way; that if there was a train corning, there 
would have been a flagman there (D-13 and 14). He 
noticed there were box cars setting on the tracks to the 
north. He could not definitely tell just where the cars 
were from the locomotive, but his judgment was two 
or three tracks to the east and fifty y.ards to the north 
(D-19 and 20). As they proceeded west across the tracks, 
Mr. Gregory did not see the approaching train until he 
was possibly on the track or within six or eight feet of the 
track. His car was in second gear when he was struck. 
The tr.ain sounded like a cyclone. There was no radio 
going in his car - no conversation prior to the accident. 
He figured his speed as very slow, but, as he said, it was 
merely an estimation, or, as he said again, "guess work/' 
for both him and the attorney (D-20 to 26). 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 
The plaintiff makes the following assigmnent of 
error: 
I. 
The court erred in granting defendant's motions for 
directed verdict ( R. 3 to 5 inclusive). 
ARGlT~IENT 
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF DEFEND-
ANT'S NEGLIGENCE TO BE SUBMITTED TO THE JURY, 
AND THE COURT WAS NOT JUSTIFIED IN GRANTING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS FOR DIRECTED VERDICT. 
There is only one assign1nent of error set forth and 
' it is upon that one point the plaintiff relies. 
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The first motion offered by defendant (R. 3) had 
two grounds : 
1. That there was no evidence that the defendant 
was guilty of any negligent act or omission. 
2. That the uncontradicted evidence showed the 
sole proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries was her own 
negligence or the negligence of her husband, the driver 
of the car. 
In the second motion (R. 4), the defendant sets forth 
four grounds for the motion for directed verdict: 
1. That there was no evidence to prove that the 
railroad was negligent. 
2. There was no evidence that any negligence on the 
part of the defendant w.as the proximate cause of plain-
tiff's injuries. 
3. The uncontradicted evidence was that the sole 
proximate cause of plaintiff's injury was the negligence 
of the driver of the automobile. 
4. The uncontradicted evidence was that plaintiff 
'vas guilty of contributory negligence. 
The order (R. 5) granted the motions of defendant. 
The motions were pra.ctic.ally the same, and the court 
in its order said they had been argued and fully consider-
ed (R. 5). The argument appears on about five lines 
(R. 72). The court's full consideration of the matter falls 
in one line wherein he says: "I believe the motion is well 
taken" (R. 74). 
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The evidence clearly shows that this intersection is 
on 4th North, one of the busy streets of Salt Lake City, 
and that it crosses either six or seven tracks (Exhibit 1). 
The track upon which the train was running curved to the 
northwest north of the intersection, as can be seen from 
the picture, Exhibit 12, and the map, Exhibit 1. The 
uncontradicted testimony of Marion Gregory, the driver 
of the automobile, who is now deceased, shows that it 
was customary to have a flagman there when trains were 
about to cros.s the intersection. Mr. Gregory had gone 
over that crossing, as he said, "lots and lots of times," 
and on that date his positive testimony was there was 
no flagman. His testimony as to how he depended on 
the watchman will be found in his depo.sition : 
"Q. You told me you heard the sound of the 
Diesel Engine as you came fron1 the east before 
you got on the tracks¥ 
"A. That is right. 
"Q. Did that sound stop¥ 
"A. \Vell I wouldn't say it stopped, and I 
wouldn't say it kept on because, for this reason, 
just like me, you or anybody else. if you was to 
drive down here to a crossing that you knew that 
you was supposed to be stopped by a flagn1an, or 
son1e sign like that to keep you from driving ontD 
a track or anything: after there was none there, 
I felt safe and I felt that the right-of-way was 
1nine, which I have crossed that track before then, 
when there was trains cmniug and stopped in 20 
feet of that crossing there. And when there was 
no flagman there to stop you and you had the 
right-of-way and you knew you had the right-of-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
9 
way, you would feel safe in driving on too and that 
is just what I did. 
"Q. Well, Mr. Gregory, as I understand it 
then you looked for the watchman, and when you 
saw no watchman, and you saw the way ahead 
of you clear, you figured you had the right-of-way~ 
"A. I figured I was s.afe. 
"Q. You figured you were safe, you had the 
right-of-way, so you then proceeded on because of 
there not being a watchman, you figured it was 
clear. 
"A. That is right. 
"Q. And you had no recollection of hearing 
that Diesel Engine again after that~ 
"A. Well, not particularly. Just like any 
other man. If you thought you was safe, and the 
watchman was supposed to be there to take care 
of a thing like that, you wouldn't expect it to run 
across on you. 
"Q. ·when you didn't see a watchman there, 
you just relied on the fact the way was clear and 
went ahead, is that right~ 
''A. That is right." (D-13 and 1-t). 
\Vhile the absence of a flagman will not absolve a 
person approaching a railroad crossing from the duty 
of exercising ordinary care for his own safety, however, 
if a traveller knows that the crossing is protected by a 
flagman and upon his approach observes that a flag1nan 
is not there to give warning, the traveller may regard 
that fact as some insurance to him that he can safely 
proceed. 
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Pippy v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 79 U. 439, 11 P 
(2) 305, at page 309, says: 
"and that when a traveler approaching a 
crossing has an unobstructed view of the track for 
a sufficient distance to see .and discover a train 
in time to avoid colliding with it and advances 
upon the intersection and is struck by the train, 
a presumption arises that he did not look or if he 
did look he did not heed what he saw and thus is 
guilty of negligence, unless under circumstances 
of exceptional cases u·here he is misled u·ithout his 
fault by some act of the company. (Italics ours) 
Clark v. Union Pac. R. Co., 70 Utah 29, 257 P. 
1050." 
Tanzi v. J..' ew York Ce,ntral Railroad Co. (Ohio Su-
preme Court, 1951) 98 K .E. 2d 39, 2-± ALR 2d 1151: 
"Where a railroad does undertake to provide 
a watchman to warn of the approach of all trains 
at a crossing, it should reasonably anticipate the 
effect of its having undertaken such an obligation. 
If it does, it nwy readily anticipate injuries to 
innocent parties due to a failure to giYe a custo-
Inary warning which is reasonably expected by a 
n1otorist. In effect, the railroad has so acted as 
to induce others to act in reliance upon its action. 
Even if such others are negligent as a 1natter of 
law in so acting. the result of the action of the rail-
road nw~· be to put innocent third parties in peril. 
" 
"The rule generally recognized is that, not-
withstanding that a railroad is under no dutY to 
1naintain a flagman at a particular crossino- if it 
ha8 customaril~· provided one to w~aru of tl;e ap-
proach of all trains to that crossing, then, at least 
so far as persons who know of that customary 
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practice are concerned, the failure of a watchman 
to warn of an approaching train may constitute 
negligence, even in an instance where the approach 
of such train would not ordinarily involve .an un-
usual hazard to an approaching automobile ... .'' 
The annotation following the above case at 24ALR2d 
1161 discusses the absence of a customary flagman at a 
railroad crossing. 
Mr. Gregory, as he put it, had traveled over this 4th 
X orth crossing lots and lots of times. He grew to depend 
upon the watchman giving him a signal when a train was 
.approaching, and the absence of the watchman in this 
case was definitely negligence on the part of the railroad. 
The railroad was also negligent in failing to keep a 
proper lookout for the Gregory automobile crossing the 
intersection. The railroad failed to sound a whistle or 
ring .a bell to warn the Gregorys of their approach, and 
this omission constituted negligence. Even if the testi-
mony as to the lack of warning by bell or whistle is nega-
tive it is a question for the jury. 
Hudson v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., (Supreme 
Court of Utah 1951), 120 Utah 245,233 Pacific 
Jd 357. 
The Gregory car was going at a slow r.ate of speed. 
The railroad had an opportunity of observing it, and 
should have blown a whistle, rung a bell or stopped the 
train. The train did not come to a stop until 612 feet 
beyond the point of impact. The snapshots, plaintiff's 
Exhibits 8, 9, 10 and 11, show the terrific force with which 
the diesel struck the Gregory car. These pictures also 
show without question that this was not one of those cases 
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where the front of the automobile struck the side of the 
diesel, but this was a case where this car was struck by 
the diesel and knocked and dragged 97 feet south on the 
tr.ack. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 12 is a very good picture looking 
north along the track from the cros_sing where the acci-
dent occurred. This exhibit demonstrates clearly that the 
train would have to come around a bend at a point north 
of the intersection, and it would be very difficult for a 
traveller to see the approaching train until it was quite 
close to the intersection. It also shows the difficulty that 
a driver of a car would have in seeing the approaching 
train should there be box cars to the north of the track, 
which there were in this ca.se. 
The court's ruling, perhaps, would have been correct 
if Marion Gregory, the driver, were the plaintiff in the 
action. He is not the plaintiff: Pearl Gregory, his wife, 
is the plaintiff. 
Bcnsou v. Deuz:er & Rio Graude R.R. Co., 4: r. (~) 
38, 286 P.(2) 790. 
In this case it is unfortunate that she only had the 
cold testimony of her husband in a deposition. It is un-
fortunate that on account of the severe injuries she sus-
tained that she had no n1e1nory as to ·what occurred before 
or after the wreck, and it n1ust be presmned, in the ab-
sence of contrar~- evidence, that she did everything neces-
sary to protect herself. 
Utah is con1mitted to the doctrine that a guest may 
recover against a third person despite the contributory 
negligence of a ho.st driver. In other words, the negli-
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gence of M.arion Gregory was not imputable to the plain-
tiff. 
Hudson v. Union Pacific Railroad, supra; 
Zenakis v. Garrett Freightlines, 1 U (2) 299, 265 
P(2) 1007. 
Assu1ning for the sake of argument but not conceding 
as a fact, that Marion Gregory was negligent, if the 
negligence of the railroad company w.as a contributing 
factor, and contributed to the proximate cause of plain-
tiff's injuries, then the court was definitely wrong in its 
rulings. Can this court say, or anyone say, from the evi-
dence in this case that plaintiff's injuries were caused 
solely by the negligence of M.arion Gregory~ The un-
contradicted evidence shows there was no watchman, 
shows that Marion Gregory had grown dependent upon 
the watchman at that particular crossing, and that on this 
morning when he saw there w.as no watchman there, and 
he looked up and down and proceeded to cross, and as he 
got on the railroad track, it sounded like a "cyclone," and 
that is all he remembers. 
A_ great deal was made by counsel for the railroad 
company in examining the 71-year-old, uneducated 
laborer from Oklahoma on pinning him to .a definite 
speed. The old man said he w.as going slow, and there is 
no question but that he was going slow, but whether that 
slowness was -!, 6, 10 or 15 miles per hour, or even more, 
is open to conjecture as Mr. Gregory said it was his esti-
mation and his guess. 
Defendant cannot point out in any way, shape or 
form .any contributory negligence by Mrs. Gregory. She 
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was grievously injured and had no memory of what oc-
curred either before or after the accident. There is evi-
dence of her severe head injuries, in this record for 
only one purpose, to show that her statement that she had 
no memory was not exaggerated. As the judge in the 
lower court said, this directed verdict amounts to 
nothing more than a non-suit (R. 75), and in granting 
this directed verdict or non-suit, every presumption is in 
favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant who 
makes the motion. 
Plaintiffs contend that in granting defendant's mo-
tion for .a directed verdict the trial court failed to give 
due weight to the well-settled rule that a directed verdict 
is not proper unless, after taking all the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the plaintiff, and all inferences 
reasonably drawn therefron1, there is nothing upon which 
a finding in favor of the plaintiff could be supported. 
The jury could reasonably ha\e found that the negli-
gence of defendant's watchn1an in failing to warn the 
driver caused :1\{r. Gregory to proceed. The jury could 
have reasonably inferred that if the watelnnan had warned 
the driver, l\1r. Gregory, he would lun-e heeded and 
stopped. The jur~- could lun-e found and could have 
reasonably inferred that the negligence of the railroad 
to warn :1\{r. Gregory b~- sounding a whistle or bell caused 
t hr aceidPnt. 
"It is wPll to keep in Inind ... that rig·hts and 
dutie~ of a tra\·c·1er and of a railroad con~pan~- at 
ero~s1ng~ are Inutual and reciprocal. The whole 
duty is not cast upon either one or the other to 
prevent collisions and injuries. The traveler may 
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not carelessly and heedlessly attempt to pass on a 
crossing on the .assumption that the railroad will 
look out for him. Neither may a railroad company, 
merely because it is the favored traffic, careles.s-
ly and heedlessly operate its trains over crossings 
at an unusual and excessive speed .and without giv-
ing adequate warnings, or create a misleading set 
of circumstances and rely upon the assumption 
that the traveling public may look out for their 
s.afety and keep out of the way of the trains." 
Toomer's Estate v. Union Pac. R. Co., 121 Utah 
37, 239 P(2) 163. 
The railroad failed in its duty to the plaintiff and 
even though the driver, ~ir. Gregory, was negligent, the 
plaintiff's ease should have been submitted to the jury. 
\Ye need not bolster with authority that rule of law that 
determination of what is the proximate cause of an acci-
dent is essentially a jury question. 
Valles v. Union Pac. R. Co., (Idaho) 238 P. (2) 
115-l-. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff contends that the trial court acted arbi-
trarily in not allowing this case to go to the jury. There 
was clearly a jury question presented to the court and the 
negligence of the defendant could be predicated upon the 
following: 
(a) Excessive speed. 
(b) Failure to keep lookout. 
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(c) Failure to give proper warning by whistle or 
bell. 
(d) Absence of customary flagman at railroad 
crossing. 
One or all of the negligent acts of the defendant were 
the proximate cause of the injuries sustained by the 
plaintiff. 
All of these points, except the speed, were supported 
by uncontradicted evidence and the speed could be de-
duced from the exhibits. 
The plaintiff respectfully asks that the trial court 
grant the plaintiff a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAY S. McCARTY and 
LEE NEFF TAYLOR 
.Attot·neys for Plaintiff and 
Appellant 
409 Boston Building 
Sa~t Lake City 11, lTtah 
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